REST (Representational State Transfer) has been bandied around as a term for a long time when it comes to API design, and it’s not hard to see the attraction. It relies on the pre-existing HTTP protocol, which is pretty much what the web already runs on, and if implemented well it can make use of a lot of features of HTTP (such as caching). This is a huge boon to application developers, saving them having to learn/implement a new technology/protocol and implement these features themselves. Continue reading
A security expert once said to me, “It’s the fastest teams and the fastest systems that get used for new features, not the most appropriate, and this causes security breaches”. I never understood what he meant, until I saw it with my own eyes.
Java is strange, in that it makes a distinction between runtime exceptions (which don’t need to be declared, and can bubble all the way up to the top of the stack), and checked exceptions, which need to be either wrapped in a “try-catch” block, or declared in the method signature so that the calling method will have to deal with them.
This is one of the fundamental aspects of Java synchronisation, but I have seen so many people get it wrong when I’m interviewing them. It’s very simple, but slightly contrary to how you might think synchronisation works.
- In the event of a breach or an infringement of your companies responsibilities, timely and appropriate escalation is required.
- During one breach I witnessed at a company I used to work for, inappropriate and untimely escalation made the situation a lot worse; the dev team and their managers failed to escalate a serious issue (users credentials being logged in a log file) quickly and appropriately, and as result the situation escalated.
- access to files is often logged. In the case of a breach, the lower the number of people who accessed the compromised resources the smaller the aftermath (e.g in the case of sensitive data being logged to a file, it’s easier to deal with five people who accessed the compromised file, than thirty). Reducing initial propagation helps this.
Once data leaves your system, your ability to control it rapidly diminishes. However there are steps you can take to mitigate risks:
- Only giving clients the data they require
- For example, with a centralized service application this would involve analyzing what each client needs, and applying logic so that they only receive that information.
- Actively engaging with client teams, asking them about security, guiding them. Even though the data has left your system, it is still your data and you need to ensure others are being careful with it.
- Systems often accidentally reveal their workings and vulnerabilities:
- Revealing the server/component type and version in their error response -this allows the attacker to search for known vulnerabilities against that version number.
- Logging full stack traces, or worse showing them in the error response -again, this tells the attacker what libraries the system uses, and if any of those libraries have known vulnerabilities, the attacker can exploit this.
- Just because your client is internal and not ‘user facing’ don’t assume that your error responses won’t filter through to the outside -in a highly distributed system, you never know where your response will end up.
- Same goes for logging; you don’t know who will end up reading your error logs.
- Basic Action Points For A Team:
- Never log full stack traces, unless absolutely necessary.
- Confirm that non of your responses contain information about the server products you use or their versions.
- Good visualization and graphing can expose suspicious activity.
- Tools like Datadog are invaluable when coupled with appropriate queries/visualization.
- Care with configuration. Misconfiguration is one of the top 5 reasons behind companies getting hacked.
- For sensitive data and functionality, consider incorporating a per-role based permissions system to reduce risk, and help track what happened in the event of an attack.
- Principle of least privilege again helps secure a system; a leaked password isn’t any use if there is no way to invoke important processes with it.
Infosec requirements should be determined during requirements gathering and where relevant integrated into JIRA tickets as infosec non-functional requirements.